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THE TOXIC WASTE DUMP PROBLEM AND A 
SUGGESTED INSURANCE PROGRAM 
Ann Fisher* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The dramatic increase in industrialization during the twentieth 
century has been accompanied by the use of vastly larger quanti-
ties of industrial chemicals and rapid development of new chemi-
cal compounds. 1 While these chemicals have undeniably contrib-
uted to the improved standard of living, many of them require 
careful handling due to their dangerous properties. The chemical 
industry has, generally, adapted its production processes to ac-
count for difficulties such as corrosiveness, instability which may 
lead to explosion or perhaps to deterioration and loss of the de-
sired chemical characteristics, and health effects. Recently, how-
ever, attention has focused on chemical wastes. These wastes may 
be production process byproducts which happen to have no eco-
nomic value, or they may be the end result after the desired com-
pounds have been "used up." Since these wastes may be danger-
ous, it has been customary to dispose of them in special chemical 
dumps, often after sealing the wastes in drums/I 
• Ann Fisher is an Associate Professor of Economics in the department of Economics 
and Business Administration at State University College, Fredonia, New York. The author 
wishes to thank Kanji Haitani and James McDermott for their comments. 
1 About 70,000 chemicals are produced commercially, in roughly 115,000 plants in the 
United States, according to EPA's Steven Jellinek. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1978, at 27. Each 
year, 300 to 500 new chemical compounds are placed on the market. N. GREENWOOD & J. 
EDWARDS, HUMAN ENVIRONMENTS AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 273 (2d ed. 1979), and up to 2000 
new chemicals enter the environment. Public Apathy Toward Chemical Risks is Perilous, 
Conservation Foundation Letter, Sept., 1978, at 1. 
• About 126 billion pounds of hazardous wastes will be produced in 1980. CONGo Q., 
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The shortcomings of the dump or landfill disposal method have 
recently been highlighted by the events in the Love Canal area of 
the City of Niagara Falls, New York. Twenty-five years after the 
chemical dump was closed, dangerous chemicals were visible at 
ground level and were seeping into the basements of nearby 
homes. Upon identification of some of the chemicals and recogni-
tion of the potential health hazards, 239 families were ordered by 
the State of New York to leave their homes. In addition to the 
relocation assistance for these families, substantial costs were in-
curred by government in an attempt to cover the chemical landfill 
and prevent further seepage of chemicals. 
Any attempt to estimate the full costs of the Love Canal disas-
ter is fraught with difficulties, as will be discussed below. This 
article focuses upon the potential danger inherent to similar 
chemical waste dumps which are located throughout the United 
States. Sooner or later, they also will begin to leak, requiring ex-
tensive clean-up efforts. Legal responsibility fcr the clean-up 
costs may be very difficult to establish, and governmental agen-
cies may hesitate to fund the corrective action due to the ex-
tremely high costs and for fear of setting a precedent. 
How, then, can money be found to pay for, or to prevent, such 
disasters? In this article, it is argued that one possible approach 
would be to institute a federal insurance program similar to the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). While this proposal is 
not viewed as a solution to the hazardous waste problem, it has 
the potential of providing financial protection for those who find 
that their homes or businesses are dangerously close to toxic 
wastes.8 This program would complement, not substitute for, 
other policies dealing with the hazardous waste problem.· 
Mar. 22, 1980, at 795. EPA predicts hazardous wastes will increase by 3 percent per year. 
SUBCOMMITl'EE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 96th CONG., 1st SESS., W ABTE DISPOSAL 
SITE SURVEY at x (Comm. Print 1979). 
• It may be appropriate to define hazardous or toxic wastes more specifically: 
"Hazardous waste" means a waste or combination of wastes, which because of its quali-
ty, concentration, physical, chemical or infectious characteristics may: (a) cause, or sig-
nificantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious, irreversible or 
incapacitating reversible illness, or (b) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to 
human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, dis-
posed, or otherwise managed. 
Interagency Task Force on Hazardous Wastes, Draft Report 11-2, 11-3 (Mar., 1979). 
• Radioactive wastes are an important component of the hazardous waste problem. 
Since the estimation of damage and of costs of corrective action is extremely difficult at 
the present time, this proposal deals only with nonradioactive hazardous wastes. Further 
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The first part of this article explores the extent of the hazard-
ous waste problem in the United States, by examining what is 
known about the number and location of toxic waste sites and 
estimates of cleanup costs. It then describes the Love Canal disas-
ter in Niagara Falls, New York, and efforts to deal with it. To 
emphasize the widespread existence of hazardous waste dumps, a 
number of other cases are briefly described. The article then re-
views existing and pending legislation related to toxic waste dis-
posal. The Nationar Flood Insurance Program is described as a 
pattern for a policy proposal: the final section discusses a Na-
tional Hazardous Waste Insurance Program (NHWIP). 
II. THE EXTENT OF THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM: NUMBER 
OF 
SITES AND CLEANUP COSTS NATIONWIDE 
In the past, information on and management of hazardous 
waste disposal has been sketchy. In order to upgrade its informa-
tion base, EPA contracted with Fred C. Hart Associates, (a New 
York consulting firm), for a report-the Hart Study-on the 
number of hazardous waste sites in the United States and ap-
proximate cleanup costs.1I Before discussing the findings, it should 
be emphasized that these are preliminary results based on a 60-
day study. 
The responses to an October 2, 1978 letter sent to each of the 
ten regional offices indicate that there are about 30,000 disposal 
sites in the United States which may contain hazardous wastes.6 
Of these, the regional offices reported that about 800 may contain 
significant quantities of hazardous wastes.7 These numbers are to 
be relied upon with caution for a number of reasons. For example, 
study would be needed to determine the feasibility of extending this policy to situations 
where radioactive wastes are involved. 
• Much of the information in this section is from a 1979 EPA publication, FRED. C. 
HART ASSOCIATES, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CLEANUP COSTS FOR NATIONAL HAZARDOUS 
WASTE PROBLEMS (EPA Contract No. 68-01-5063, 1979) [hereinafter cited as HAta). In 
September, 1978, EPA reported knowing of 300 chemical waste dumps which presented 
health dangers, with estimated cleanup cost of $1.5 billion. Lynch, EPA Unit Admits It's 
Unable to Fix Sites, Buffalo Courier-Express, Sept. 22, 1978. These figures are far smaller 
(both in terms of number of sites and cleanup costs) than those reported in the Hart 
study. Although EPA had stated that there were probably many more unknown hazardous 
waste dumps, this reflects EPA's gradually dawning awareness of the scope of the problem. 
a The letter is reprinted in HART, supra note 5, at 38-43 and Hearing Before the Sub-
committee on Oversight and Investigations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 320-324 (1978). 
7 HART, supra note 5, at 11. 
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some of the regions reported that all landfills may contain haz-
ardous wastes. Some regions omitted sites-perhaps due to lack 
of data-related to specific types of significant problems such as 
pesticides. Other regions gave rio methodology for their estimates. 
The most important factor which may affect the accuracy of the 
estimates stems from the EPA headquarters letter itself. This let-
ter, in three separate paragraphs, instructs the regional offices to 
supply only that information already on file or readily available 
about hazardous waste dumps.8 The regional offices are also dis-
couraged from discovering additional hazardous waste disposal 
situations. It is difficult to evaluate the magnitude of the overesti-
mates (since some regions included all landfills) and the underes-
timates (due to lack of information) of sites which may contain 
hazardous wastes. The cautious tone of the EPA letter however, 
may have encouraged under-estimation.9 
In recognition of some of the shortcomings of the figures re-
ported by the ten regions, the Hart Study made an alternative 
estimate of the number of sites. According to Section 3005 of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), any 
facility involved in the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazard-
ous wastes must obtain a permit. to Fred C. Hart Associates esti-
mated that 19,365 active sites are presently needed to handle the 
• It is not expected that EPA make any effort to "discover" sites (through field visits, 
substantial file searches or other means) for which we do not currently have informa· 
tion ... 
It is expected that this information will derive only from your current regional files. 
However, if you can readily and conveniently solicit additional information and help 
from the States, we encourage this. It is recognized that the development of this inven· 
tory will add national visibility to the incidents identified therein because the inven· 
tory will be shared with the Congress and will probably be requested by and be made 
available to the public. Because of this, incidents included in the inventory should be 
situations for which you have more than circumstantial information, the public (at 
least locally) is already aware, and publicly accessible information is already on file . 
. . . It need not cover situations for which all or most information must be obtained 
from the States, local agencies or others or for which field inspections must be made to 
"discover" and describe the situation. There definitely is no requirement to go out and 
"discover" hazardous situations, nor is it expected to inventory situations for which 
only unconfirmed information is available. 
Id. at 39·40. 
• Underestimation would be consistent with the June 16, 1978 EPA memo directing the 
Hazardous Waste Management Division not to look for imminent hazards. This memo was 
still in force on October 30, 1978. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 317 (1978). In November, 1978, EPA began to seek 
out and monitor abandoned hazardous waste sites. Id. at 459·460 . 
• 0 42 U.S.C.A. § 6925 (1977). 
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generation of hazardous wastes and, will, therefore, require per-
mits.l1 On the assumption that a site is active for ten years, and 
may pose health threats for forty years after being closed, and 
after adjusting the 19,365 active sites in 1978 for the smaller 
number of active sites in earlier decades, an estimate of 50,664 is 
given for the hazardous waste site inventory.12 The assumptions 
behind this estimate may be questioned. The forty-year danger 
period is twice the twenty-year monitoring guideline of the RCRA 
for properly operated and closed sites. However, for very durable 
compounds, even forty years may be too short. It could also be 
argued that the 5 percent decay rate per decade, for estimating 
the smaller number of active sites in earlier decades, may be inac-
curate. Thus, the 50,664 number is a very rough estimate of all 
active plus inactive sites which may contain hazardous wastes. 
Two of the ten EPA regions did not estimate the number of 
sites with significant problems. For the remaining eight regions, 
about 4 percent of the sites were reported as possibly containing 
significant quantities of hazardous wastes. If this 4 percent is ap-
plied to the 32,000 estimate, then 1,280 sites may have significant 
problems. IS On the other hand, EPA has estimated that as much 
as 90 percent of hazardous wastes are disposed of improperly. 
Fred C. Hart Associates estimated that 75 percent of landfill sites 
are in locations such as wetlands, major aquifers, and floodplains 
which are particularly subject to contamination problems.14 If 
these percentages are applied to the 50,664 inventory, as many as 
34,198 sites could have significant problems. 
In summary, the Hart Study implies that there are between 
32,000 and 50,000 hazardous waste sites in the United States, 
with approximately 1,300 to 34,000 of these sites containing sig-
nificant amounts of hazardous wastes which could damage health 
or the environment. Unfortunately, this very wide range of esti-
11 HART, supra note 5, at 18. RCRA mandated that EPA issue regulations by April, 
1978, listing specific hazardous wastes and setting standards for generators and transport-
ers of these wastes. Within 90 days of the listing, persons owning or operating hazardous 
waste treatment or storage facilities must obtain a permit. EPA's listing was announced on 
May 5, 1980, to be effective in November, 1980 (so permits have not yet been issued). Wall 
St. J., May 6, 1980, at 2. 
11 HART, supra note 5, at 23. 
II [d. at 25 . 
.. FRED C. HART ASSOCIATES, TASK IV-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, DRAFT REPORT 66-74 (EPA 
Contract No. 68-014895, 1978). 
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mates does not pinpoint specific sites. 111 
Some cleanup cost information was available for 51 sites in the 
information base of 232 sites. This cost information ranged from 
$6.3 to $18.4 million per site.18 Extrapolated to the national level 
for 1,280 sites, costs would range from $8.1 to $23.6 billion. 
Since these are very gross estimates, twenty-four sites were an-
alyzed in depthP The cases were categorized by facility type, 
problem type, and waste type. For each site, unit cost was esti-
mated for all appropriate remedial measures. These measures 
usually included only those actions of an emergency nature to re-
duce risks to human health. Less cost information was available 
for actions which would significantly reduce the source of contam-
inant migration. 18 
.. More recently, EPA has listed 151 sites "which may contain potentially dangerous 
quantities of hazardous waste," according to EPA Deputy Administrator Barbara Blum. 
u.PJ. Release, July 12, 1979. Cleanup of these sites was stated to be the highest agency 
priority. No explanation was given for this small number compared with the Hart study 
figures. [d. 
In October, 1979, a Congressional Subcommittee published the results of its own study 
of waste disposal sites, based on a survey of the 53 largest U.S. chemical companies. SUB-
COMMITI'EE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 96th CONG., 1st SESS., WASTE DISPOSAL SITE 
SURVEY (Comm. Print 1979). The information did not indicate how many of the reported 
3,383 sites actually contain hazardous wastes, partly because of the lack of federal defini-
tions of "hazardous" waste. [d. at XIV. However, at least 1,099 of the sites are closed, and 
will not be subject to regulation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6987 (1977). In addition to including only 14 percent of the chemical 
companies in the country, the average record coverage extended back to only 1968. SUB-
COMMITI'EE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, supra, at XIII. The companies also re-
ported 960 hauling companies who removed wastes to unknown places. [d. at XXV. 
State efforts are also underway ill order to narrow the range of estimates for the number 
of hazardous waste sites which require attention. For example, 215 disposal sites were 
identified in Erie and Niagara Counties, New York-the region containing the Love Canal. 
Interagency Task Force on Hazardous Wastes, Draft Report (Mar., 1979). Of these, 36 
sites have definitely received large quantities of hazardous wastes, and remedial work may 
be necessary. [d. at 11-2. Legal responsibility for cleanup will be difficult to determine, 
since 35 of the 36 sites are no longer active. Another 116 sites may have received signifi-
cant quantities of hazardous wastes; at least 62 of these are inactive. [d. A more recent 
interim report found 520 toxic waste dumpsites throughout New York. NEW YORK STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, TOXIC SUB-
STANCES IN NEW YORK'S ENVIRONMENT (May, 1979). An update of this report is expected in 
the summer of 1980. Unfortunately, these reports contain little information on cleanup 
costs. 
,. HART, supra note 5, at 30. 
17 While an attempt was made to make the 24 representative of the 232 cases, data 
availability was also an important consideration in site selection. 
18 The cost information was supplemented by assuming that non-hazardous wastes 
methods could be applied to handling of hazardous wastes. This may severely bias cost 
estimates downward, since chemical/physical treatment of potentially hazardous industrial 
1980] TOXIC WASTE INSURANCE 427 
For the twenty-four selected cases, two cost levels were esti-
mated. For Level I, measures would be taken to prevent the dete-
rioration of existing problem sites such as minimum acceptable 
cleanup activities on an emergency short-term basis. For Level II, 
thorough cleanup costs were estimated for permanent protection 
of health and environment.1i In both estimates, third-party costs 
were omitted. 
With disclaimers regarding site-specific cost variations relative 
to type and volume of waste, and additional disclaimers due to 
lack of information on site size and extent of contamination, the 
Hart Study estimated average cost for Level I treatment to be 
$3.6 million per site, and $25.9 million per site for Level II treat-
ment.20 Adjusting the 1,280 potential sites figure to eliminate 
those which are likely to be misidentified so that they end up not 
needing cleanup, and omitting radioactive waste sites requiring 
separate analysis, total Level I costs would be $3.9 billion.21 Since 
about 11 percent of the sites are government owned, and about 64 
percent of the sites are privately owned but financially nonviable, 
this implies potential taxpayer expense of $2.9 billion for Level I 
wastes may cost $60 to $90 per ton, compared with open dumping at a cost of $2 to $3 per 
ton. Darnay, Solid Waste Management in Transition, PUB. MANAGEMENT, Aug. 1974, at 2. 
10 For example, Level I costs included site investigation, waste removal or clay cover, 
perimeter protection with dikes or ditches, security fencing, monitoring and administra-
tion. Level II added complete waste removal and disposal at secure facilities plus addi-
tional monitoring. 
I. HART, supra note 5, at 36. Another report gives per unit cleanup costs for various 
activities: 
Action 
In-place confinement of con-
taminant-immediate costs 
Excavation and disposal at 
secure facility 
Cover and fencing (where water 
contamination does not occur) 
Removal of contaminant from 
Cost Estimates 
$800,000 per acre 
$5-$10 million per acre 
$40,000 per acre 
drinking water $.50 to $5.00 per 1000 gallons 
Dredging with land disposal $10-$50 per cubic yard 
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, TOXIC SUBSTANCES IN NEW YORK'S ENVIRONMENT 13-19 (May, 1979). 
I. 8 percent of the information base involved radioactive wastes. Since these sites may 
require substantially higher cleanup costs, they were not considered. 8 percent of the 
twenty-four in-depth cases were found not to need corrective action. (Le., sites which had 
been identified as potential problems turned out not to be problems.) These factors allow 
reduction of the number of problem sites by 16 percent, with the full recognition that 
radioactive wastes must be handled separately. 
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cleanup. Similarly, total Level II costs would be $27.8 billion, 
with $20.9 billion for privately owned, financially non-viable sites 
and government owned sites. 
If the 4 percent figure for sites with significant quantities of 
toxic wastes is applied to the larger population estimate of haz-
ardous waste sites, and the adjustment is made as in the above 
paragraph, then total Level I costs would be $6.1 billion. Of this, 
only $1.5 billion would be for privately owned, financially viable 
sites. Level II costs would total $44.1 billion with $10.9 billion of 
that for privately owned, financially viable sites. 
While these cost figures seem very large, they may well be 
under-estimates, due to difficulties with the data on costs and 
with the estimates of how many sites require attention.22 If new 
techniques become available for handling toxic wastes, that would 
also affect the cost figures. These estimates certainly underesti-
mate the costs to society, since all third-party costs have been 
ignored. 
At this point one toxic waste disposal area, the Love Canal, will 
be examined in more detail, primarily in an attempt to specify 
the costs. Even though this may not be a typical hazardous waste 
problem, it is one for which more information is available. 
III. THE LOVE CANAL 
A. The Love Canal Disaster 
In the late nineteenth century, William T. Love began the con-
struction of a power canal which was to connect the upper and 
lower levels of the Niagara River.28 The technological break-
through enabling long distance transmission of electricity com-
bined with an economic depression caused Love's project to fail 
financially, after the construction of about one-half mile of the 
canal covering 16 acres. 
II For instance, it was earlier stated that as many as 34,000 sites could have substantial 
problems. See text at page 5; the largest number of sites considered for the cost estimates 
above is 2,027. 
The Chemical Manufacturers Association, on the other hand, claims that there are only 
180 to 235 abandoned hazardous waste sites, with approximate cleanup costs of $1 million 
per site. CMA argues that total cleanup costs for abandoned sites would thus cost $300-
$500 million, with any other inactive sites owned by a financially viable company being 
cleaned up by the company. 1 INSIDE E.P.A. No.4, at 2-3 (1980) . 
• a For background information and preliminary health studies reports, see NEW YORK 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, LOVE CANAL-PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB (Sept., 1978). 
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After several years the abandoned canal began to be used by 
Hooker Chemical Company, now a subsidiary of Occidental Pe-
troleum, as a disposal site, and the standard disposal techniques 
of that era were used. Liquid, solid, and semi-solid chemical 
wastes were carried to the Love Canal in metal or fiber drums, 
which were then emptied directly into the canal, or into larger 
drums.1f The empty transporting drums were subsequently either 
reused or buried with the wastes. Between 1942 and 1952, approx-
imately 21,800 tons of 82 different chemicals were dumped in the 
Love CanaP5 The clay~type dirt around the canal was considered 
to be desirable, since its low permeability would prevent migra-
tion of chemicals to nearby areas. 
In 1953, the Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation sold 
the Love Canal to the City of Niagara Falls. The dump was cov-
ered with earth, and a public elementary school was built on the 
central section. The deed for the land states that chemicals were 
buried in the canal, and releases Hooker Chemical Company from 
any responsibility for future risk or liability. The school was built 
on a slab in order to avoid chemical erosion of a more conven-
tional foundation. In the late 1950's, houses were built along the 
edges of the landfill. People were attracted to the area partly by 
the new school and partly by promises of a municipal park for the 
area. They apparently were not told that the homes were adjacent 
to a covered chemical dump.le 
From the very beginning, residents noticed unusual aspects of 
the area. Children and their pets received strange burns from 
playing on the covered landfill. Trees turned black. Rocks thrown 
against pavement would ignite with bright colors. People in the 
area did not attach much significance to these events until heavy 
rains during the mid-1970's began to intensify the odors which 
I. Available sources cite different dates for the first dumping, with some dates going 
back to the 1920's. [d. at 3. According to the Interagency Task Force on Hazardous 
Wastes, Hooker Electrochemical Corporation made a written agreement in 1942 with the 
Canal's owner (the Niagara Power and Development Company), which allowed Hooker to 
dispose of wastes in the Canal. Hooker purchased the site in 1947. Interagency Task Force 
on Hazardous Wastes, Draft Report III-72, III-73 (Mar., 1979). 
I. [d. at 111-73. The Love Canal was also used for municipal wastes from the City of 
Niagara Falls, and may have been a disposal site for other chemical companies. N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 5, 1978, at 18; Buffalo Courier Express, May 30, 1980, at 1, 26-A. 
"' Manufacturer's Fees Weighed for Cleaning Chemical Waste Sites, Wall St. J., Apr. 
12,1979, at 12; Ginsberg, Interagency Task Force on Hazardous Wastes: Hearing Officer's 
Report 27-28 (Oct., 1979). 
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had been noticed in the neighborhood, particularly in basements 
lining the south section of the Love Canal. For residents and for 
government agencies, recognition of the potential danger of the 
Love Canal has been characterized as a process of gradual dawn-
ing awareness, rather than a sudden, authoritative announce-
ment.27 The first expression of government concern may have 
been in September, 1976, when New York's Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation representatives tested the site for Mirex, 
a highly persistent insecticide which is a suspected carcinogen. In 
January, 1977, the City of Niagara Falls began a hydrogeological 
investigation of the Love Canal. The preliminary results showed 
the need for more information. In April, 1978, then State Health 
Commissioner, Dr. Robert P. Whalen, found site conditions to be 
a serious health threat, and ordered the county health commis-
sioner to begin corrective action and health studies. On August 2, 
1978, Commissioner Whalen declared a state of emergency, closed 
the 99th Street School, and recommended evacuation of pregnant 
women and children under two years of age living in the first two 
rings.28 Ring 1 contained those homes with back yards adjacent to 
the canal. Ring 2 added the houses across the street. The two 
rings covered an area two streets wide and three blocks long. On 
August 9, 1978, Governor Carey announced the evacuation of all 
236 families in Rings 1 and 2.18 
The recognition of danger became more widespread, as it was 
discovered that parts of the canal's walls covered swales-old 
creekbeds-which at one time flowed out from the canal. 30 Higher 
permeability in these spots had resulted in substantial leaching 
.. A. Levine, The Love Canal: The Hidden Disaster (Mar. 26, 1979) (lecture given at 
SUNY -Fredonia) . 
• s Gradual dawning of awareness may depend upon multiple factors. There seems to be 
a strong tendency for people to feel that things which do not have fairly immediate effects 
are not harmful. This is typified by comments such as "I have lived here for X years and 
I'm fine, so it won't hurt me," or "It may happen to the other guy, but not to me." An-
other problem stems from conflicting evidence, or from conflicting news coverage, or from 
reversal of position (such as the cranberries-cause-cancer scare of 1959). For other exam-
ples, see Public Apathy Toward Chemical Risks is Perilous, Conservation Foundation Let-
ter, Sept., 1978, at 1. 
•• The number of families was later expanded slightly. As of October, 1979, 239 homes 
had been purchased by the state's Urban Development Corporation, at a cost of $10.2 
million. Buffalo Courier-Express, Oct. 18, 1979, at 1. Three families elected to remain in 
the first two rings. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1979. 
3. Statement of John J. LaFalce before the Environment and Public Works Subcommit-
tee on Environmental Pollution and the Subcommittee on Resource Protection (Mar. 29, 
1979). 
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from the canal. On February 8, 1979, Commissioner Whalen re-
sponded by recommending that pregnant women and children 
under two years of age who lived along the swales be temporarily 
relocated at state expense. 
Recognition of the Love Canal's impact has widened since the 
initial action of closing the 99th Street School and evacuating re-
sidents in the first two rings. On August 30, 1979, the Niagara 
Falls Board of Education closed the 93rd Street School because of 
possible toxic chemical contamination in two creeks which flow 
near the school. In late August, 1979, residents near the remedial 
construction area complained of illness caused by noxious fumes 
from the construction work. The state paid for temporary reloca-
tion of 268 residents, as long as each family provided weekly med-
ical certification that a member's illness was canal related.31 For 
the two-month period during which construction was completed, 
this relocation cost the state about $6,000 per day. 32 
The Love Canal Homeowners Association has been instrumen-
tal in increasing public awareness of the issues involved. One in-
dication of their effectiveness may be the attempt of the state to 
sell ninety-six homes along the canal, provided the purchasers 
would move them away from the construction area. Only eight of 
the homes were bought.33 Because the state health department is 
unwilling to certify that these structures, or structures anywhere 
in the state, are risk-free, several municipalities in the area have 
passed resolutions prohibiting relocation of the homes within 
their boundaries. The primary concern of the communities was 
that speculators might sell the homes to buyers without notifying 
them of potential contamination danger. The highly visible 
Homeowners Association continues to call for the relocation of 
additional families around the Love Canal; to lobby for further 
assistance, and to act as watchdog for the construction and moni-
toring activities. 
Independent research suggested higher incidence of illness 
along the sWale areas, and the Congressional Subcommittee on 
., Buffalo Courier-Express, Sept. 5, 1979. Many doctors were reluctant to certify that an 
illness was caused by the toxic chemicals. Id . 
•• Id. Sept. 19, 1979 . 
• a Id. July 11, 1979, at 1. Buildings not moved by September 15, 1979 were to be demol-
ished. However, the City of Niagara Falls did not give permits for the demolition debris to 
be pushed into the basements, so the houses are still standing (and still owned by the 
state's Urban Development Corporation). 
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Oversight and Investigations augmented public pressure for per-
manent relocation of 140 additional families in the area surround-
ing the Love Canal.3• On October 16, 1979, Governor Hugh L. Ca-
rey announced that New York State would spend about $5 
million to purchase the equity of the homes of approximately 100 
families that had been temporarily relocated to area motels. The 
relocation proposal was then expanded so that all residents within 
a ten block radius of the canal (550 families) would have the op-
tion of selling their homes to the state. With supplemental funds 
expected to come from the Niagara Falls City government and 
federal sources, a new task force was to be established to revital-
ize the neighborhood. 311 
A May, 1980 study showed that eleven of thirty-six Love Canal 
area residents had chromosome abnormalities, which is a much 
higher proportion than normal.3S EPA announced that 790 fami-
lies in a ten-block area would be temporarily relocated at federal 
expense. However, delays in the relocation effort led the frus-
trated residents, operating through the Love Canal Homeowners 
Association, to hold two EPA representatives as hostages for sev-
eral hours on May 19, 1980. Two days later, President Carter is-
sued a federal emergency declaration, allowing temporary reloca-
tion for up to a year.37 Local citizen groups, including the 
Ecumenical Task Force of the Niagara Frontier, the Concerned 
Area Residents, the LaSalle Development Residents Association, 
People for Permanent Relocation, Catholic Charities, and the 
Love Canal Homeowners Association continue to lobby for per-
a. SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 96th CONG., 1st SESS., HAZARDOUS 
WASTE DISPOSAL REPORT 14 (Comm. Print 1979) . 
• a Buffalo Courier-Express, Oct. 27, 1979, at 1. Approximately seventy-five tenant fami-
lies are eligible for relocation assistance, in addition to the homeowners. [d. Nov. 3, 1979, 
at 1. By November 30, 1979, 345 additional homeowners had requested state appraisals of 
their property. [d. Dec. 1, 1979, at 1. However, residents were reluctant to begin looking 
for a new home, since the results of the appraisal were not expected to be announced until 
April, 1980, with acquisition expected in mid-June. Buffalo Evening News, April 10, 1980, 
at 17. The reluctance of local governments to become potentially liable for cleanup and 
rehabilitation costs delayed the establishment of the task force. Legislation for a modified 
task force was under state consideration in early June. Buffalo Evening News, June 3, 
1980, at 35. 
H Buffalo Courier-Express, May 17, 1980, at 1. 
•• Buffalo Courier-Express, May 22, 1980, at 1, 3-4 & 20. The President's declaration 
allows temporary relocation under Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) au-
thority. However, present law does not give FEMA or EPA the power to permanently 
relocate residents. Buffalo News, May 31, 1980, at 1, and June 6, 1980, at 1. Senator Jacob 
Javits (R.-N.Y.) has introduced legislation to purchase the residents' homes. 
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manent relocation. 
With this background on the Love Canal situation, an attempt 
will be made in the next section to specify the costs of the Love 
Canal disaster. 
B. Love Canal Cleanup Costs 
In order to remedy the Love Canal situation, a drainage system 
was constructed around the dumpsite to collect the leachate and 
prevent further migration.8a The water level in the canal was low-
ered and the French tile drainage system reversed the flow of 
groundwater, moving contaminants back toward the canal. The 
collected wastes filter through an activated carbon treatment 
plant, designed and operated by CECOS International, Inc.; for-
merly Newco Chemical Waste Systems, Inc .. The pretreated 
wastes then go into the municipal sewage system. 
Construction began at the southern end of the canal, where 
problems were most severe, on October 17, 1978. This phase of 
the project was completed in about two and one-half months, and 
construction in the central and northern zones was essentially 
completed by early November, 1979.89 After installation of the 
drains, the surface was covered with a cap of clayey material in 
order to eliminate the escape of odors, and to prevent rainwater 
from entering the canal and creating more leachate. Numerous 
test wells in and around the canal will permit monitoring of the 
hazardous wastes. 
Cost estimates for the remedial construction are given in parts 
A and B of Table 1,40 and total $11.2 million. This is only a frac-
•• Removal of the toxic chemicals and contaminated earth was judged to be prohibi-
tively expensive, as well as potentially more dangerous than the containment technique 
used (since removal would require exposure and transportation of the buried wastes). Re-
moval would also necessitate finding a suitable relocation site, and might not "rehabili-
tate" the area any faster than the method used. Love Canal Remedial Measures Demon-
stration Grant, Feb. 3, 1979, at 27-28 . 
•• By April, 1980, some seeding work remained to be done, and some monitoring wells 
still had to be sunk. Telephone conversation with DEC's Mary Kadlacek in April, 1980 . 
•• Table I: Love Canal Cleanup Costa, With Funding Source 
A. Remedial Construction, Southern Zone (completed) 
$6.55 million total. 
$1.20 million New York State 
1.35 million City of Niagara Falls 
4.00 million Federal Government-Federal Disaster Assistance Administration 
(FDAA) 
B. Remedial Construction, Northern and Central Zones (underway) 
$4.65 million total. 
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tion, however, of the costs associated with the Love Canal. The 
remainder of Table I shows estimates for other publicly funded 
costs. U These figures include health tests and medical services, 
and environmental monitoring of the site and surrounding area. 
Included also are relocation costs for those families who were 
temporarily moved out of the area during the construction phase, 
as well as for those who were permanently relocated. Permanent 
relocation involved purchase of homes and moving costs in addi-
tion to temporary rental costs. The Love Canal Homeowners As-
sociation was very concerned about possible accidents during the 
construction phase which might require evacuation from the gen-
eral area. A standby bus service was provided as a contingency 
measure. 
People were asked to leave the area in August, 1978, but many 
C. Health and Environmental Testing and Services 
$2.725 million total 
D. Temporary Relocation (including temporary relocation costs for those who eventually 
were permanently relocated) 
$883,000 total. 
B + C + D $8.258 million total 
$4.258 million New York State 
$4.000 million Federal Government-Environmental Protection 
Agency 
E. Permanent Relocation (includes acquisition costs in Rings 1 and 2) 
$9.216 million total. New York State 
F. Standby Bus Service 
$550,000 total. New York State 
G. Human Services Grant (reimbursement to the local United Way) 
$200,000 total. New York State 
H. State Aid for Property Tax Relief 
$1.0 million total. New York State 
I. Other (miscellaneous items, such as fencing, security costs, etc.) 
$800,000 total. 
$200,000 New York State 
600,000 Federal Govemment-FDAA 
TOTAL COSTS: $26.574 million 
$16.624 million New York State 
1.350 million City of Niagara Falls 
8.600 million Federal Government 
Source: New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. These cost figures 
are as of March, 1979. After the initial two-year phase, the City of Niagara Falls 
will assumtl operation of the site. These operating costs are not included. An 
April, 1980 update raises construction and relocation costs, making the new total 
$30 million from state sources plus $8 million in federal funds. However, the 
additional costs are not broken down by spending category, so the $26.574 mil-
lion figure is used in the discussion. 
.. See Table I, C through I, supra note 40. 
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of them did not find a replacement home until December, 1978. 
To ease the financial strain for those who owned homes that they 
could not occupy, or that had become less saleable due to proxim-
ity to the Love Canal area, the state lowered property taxes for 
more than 600 families through 1984 and is reimbursing local gov-
ernments for the difference in revenues. 
When all of these costs are combined with the construction 
costs, the publicly funded total is $26.574 million, shared by New 
York State, the federal government, and the City of Niagara 
Falls.42 This amount covers the first two years, during which the 
construction and assessment of effectiveness of the cleanup oper-
ation is to be completed. After that, the City of Niagara Falls will 
assume operation of the Love Canal site.43 
Any attempt to assess the costs associated with the Love Canal 
disaster is likely to be a serious underestimate. For example, re-
sidents from the area typically did not keep records of medical 
costs over a long time period. Even if those records were availa-
ble, it would be difficult to partition the medical cost figures into 
•• There is some possibility that part of these costs will be reimbursed by Hooker 
Chemical Company, or through a shifting of financial responsibility among government 
units. In August, 1978, Hooker offered to share cleanup costs up to $280,000 in its role as a 
"good corporate citizen," without accepting any liability. On December 20, 1979, the Jus-
tice Department filed a $124 million suit against Occidental Petroleum Corporation (of 
which Hooker Chemical is a subsidiary) in U.S. District Court in Buffalo. The suit names 
Olin Corporation (which operated a dump site adjacent to one of the Occidental sites) as 
codefendant. The suits claim Hooker improperly disposed of nearly 200,000 tons of chemi-
cal wastes at four sites in Niagara Falls. Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1979, at 6. On April 28, 1980 
the Attorney General of New York filed a $635 million suit against Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation and its Hooker Chemical subsidiaries at the State Supreme Court in Lock-
port, New York. Buffalo Courier-Express, April 27, 1980, at 1; Wall St. J., April 29, 1980, 
at 12. Subsequently, New York State was added as a defendant in the federal case, al-
though the state can also pursue its own case. Buffalo Courier-Express, June 12, 1980, at 1. 
The $26.6 million cost figure is also low; by April, 1980 New York's cost had reached $30 
million and the federal government had spent $8 million. These figures do not include the 
relocation and medical testing costs associated with the May 22, 1980 emergency declara-
tion. Preliminary estimates give $3-5 million for temporary relocation, Wall St. J., May 22, 
1980, at 10, revised to $8 million, Buffalo Courier-Express, June 1, 1980, at B-8. One offi-
cial estimated $33 million for temporary relocation compared with $26 million for perma-
nent relocation. Buffalo Courier-Express, May 24, 1980, at 1. The EPA-sponsored medical 
examinations are estimated to cost from $600 to $1,000 per person, Buffalo Courier-Ex-
press, June 5, 1980, at 1, while the home air samples will cost $500 each. Buffalo Courier-
Express, June 11, 1980, at 3. On the other hand it has been estimated that Hooker could 
have disposed of its Love Canal wastes at a safe site in 1952-the year the dump was 
closed-for $4 million in 1979 dollars. Hazardous Waste Control Efforts: A Frightful Mess, 
Conservation Law Foundation ~ewsletter, April, 1980, at 1. 
.a The date of City takeover had not been determined by June 15, 1980. 
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those related to medical problems induced by Love Canal and 
medical care for other reasons. As for future medical costs, it will 
be difficult to ascertain whether or not illnesses, birth defects, 
and other infirmities are related to subtle toxic effects which do 
not become evident for years or perhaps for generations. 
It also appears that new costs will continue to arise in connec-
tion with the Love Canal. EPA, for example, is expanding the 
cleanup work to nearby Black Creek which is several hundred 
yards north of the Love Canal and near the 93rd Street School, 
and has announced as well, that it will conduct an extensive 
health study to be a part of an $8 million demonstration grant 
funded by the state and federal government ..... EPA's cleanup ef-
fort is estimated to cost $270,000: $35,000 for a fence around 
Black Creek and $235,000 to clean the storm sewers ... 11 The health 
study cost estimate is $635,000. 
Relocated residents mention other out-of-pocket costs which 
have not been reimbursed. Some feel the state's assessment of 
their home was less than its true market value. Often they could 
not find a comparable home at the same price, so purchased 
larger, more expensive homes. Although the state provided some 
funds to help with moving costs, plus a supplement beyond the 
purchase price of their former home, the simple costs of settling 
into a new house generally exceeded this. The most important 
omitted costs are those which are most difficult to quantify: feel-
ings of loss of control over the situation and the anguish of uncer-
tainty as to whether future health problems will occur as a result 
of exposure to toxic chemicals. 
While the $26.574 million may be taken as a conservative mini-
mum cost estimate based on relatively hard data, a realistic upper 
cost estimate is more difficult to establish. According to the attor-
ney for the Homeowners Association, over $3 billion in claims 
have presently been filed, all related to the Love Canal. More 
claims are expected, due to the mutagenic and teratogenic nature 
of the chemicals. 
Before examining in further detail the existing and pending leg-
•• Buffalo Courier-Express, Feb. 20, 1980, at 1. EPA is operating under the Clean Water 
Act, § 311,33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (1978) (West Supp. 1980) which permits spending to remove 
a pollution threat to navigable waters. Black Creek qualifies since it empties into the Niag-
ara River . 
•• Buffalo Courier-Express, Feb. 22, 1980, at 3. The sewer work, originally expected to 
be completed in June, 1980, was behind schedule in April. [d. Apr. 9, 1980, at 2. 
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islation pertaining to toxic waste dumps, a brief review of other 
toxic waste disposal problems is appropriate. 
IV. OTHER TOXIC WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEMS 
A. North Carolina 
The Love Canal situation is hardly an isolated incident. In Au-
gust, 1978, up to 33,000 gallons of transformer oil containing 
PCB's were dumped along 210 miles of roads in North Carolina.48 
With no suitable hazardous waste disposal site, North Carolina 
adopted an interim measure, covering the oil with charcoal and 
then liquid asphalt to seal it in place. The state estimated that it 
would cost roughly $2 million to create an EPA-approved dump 
at Warrenton, North Carolina, and store the 40,000 cubic yards of 
contaminated dirt, but local residents rejected the proposal.47 On 
June 4, 1979, EPA denied North Carolina's petition to use a more 
elaborate method to cover the wastes along the roadsides. The 
closest EPA-approved site which can accept PCB wastes is in Al-
abama. To dig up the tainted soil, move it to the disposal facility, 
and pay the fee to the private operator of the site has been esti-
mated at roughly $12 million. Problems associated with trans-
porting the hazardous waste through the states between North 
Carolina and Alabama would have to be considered if this action 
were taken. Residents also rejected a· proposal for construction of 
disposal facilities in each of the fourteen counties where the con-
taminated oil was dumped. 
As in other hazardous wastes cases, the legal aspects are some-
what difficult to ascertain. Three New York men, who were in the 
business of hauling transformer oil, pleaded guilty to dumping 
the oil.48 On June 12, 1979, the executive of the North Carolina 
firm, Ward Transformer Company, where the contaminated oil 
originated, was acquitted of charges of conspiracy and being ac- . 
•• Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) are a large class of very stable industrial chemicals 
which, until recently, were widely used as lubricants, plasticizers, in transformer fluids, in 
pesticides, etc. Since PCB's are known to cause skin disease and liver damage, and are 
suspected carcinogens, EPA has phased out their use, based on the Toxic Substance Con-
trol Act, 15 V.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (West Supp. 1980) . 
.. Warren County v. State of North Carolina, No. 79-560-civ.-5 (D.N.C.) and Twitty v. 
State of North Carolina, No. 8O-41-civ.-5 (D.N.C.). EPA has filed a motion for summary 
judgement, but the court had not acted upon it by April 9, 1980 . 
•• The plea was entered on June 4, 1979, in a plea-bargain arrangement in North Caro-
lina. They are scheduled to be dentenced the week of June 23, 1980. Telephone conversa-
tion with a North Carolina EPA attorney. 
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cessory to the dumping in Halifax County, North Carolina Supe-
rior Court!9 While the transformer company executives have 
been indicted in federal court, the case was not scheduled for trial 
until late June, 1980. Even if they are found guilty, it appears 
unlikely that either the hauler or the executives will have the 
financial resources to pay for cleanup. While the oil was dumped 
on state land, EPA probably cannot make a case against the state 
to require cleanup. The questions which remain are how the 
waste is to be disposed of and who is to pay for it? 
B. Valley of the Drums 
Another well publicized toxic waste dump is the Valley of the 
Drums, near Louisville, Kentucky. Under Section 311 of the 
Water Quality Act,'O EPA is working to contain, clean up, or dis-
pose of hazardous wastes on a twenty-three acre site where drums 
of toxic chemicals had been stored since the early 1960's. In addi-
tion to stacks which were five to ten barrels high, the site opera-
tor had dug pits and trenches, into which chemicals and drums 
were dumped. 
In March, 1979, EPA worked for twenty-one days at a cost of 
$300,000 to implement a short-term solution. Since run-off from 
leaking drums had entered a nearby creek, a system was installed 
in the creek to remove volatile organics and floating compounds. 
Trenches were dug around the site in order to divert the surface 
flow to a catch basin, from which the liquid is pumped through a 
water treatment plant achieving a 98 percent reduction in pollu-
tants. On the site itself, drums were segregated and marked ac-
cording to whether the contents were solid or liquid. Empty bar-
rels were recycled, or crushed if not reusable. Nothing has been 
done about the four or more pits containing toxic chemicals, since 
the Water Quality Act does not allow EPA to stop the chemicals 
from polluting the air or ground water. EPA is still looking for a 
suitable long-range disposal method. 
C. New York 
Toxic waste dump problems have become evident in several 
'0 Ward Transformer Company is the largest rebuilder of transformers in the eastern 
United States. 
5. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (1978)(West Supp. 1980). 
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other areas.61 The waste disposal firm of Pollution Abatement 
Services of Oswego, New York is one situation with fairly reliable 
cost information.62 This firm began operating in 1970. The result-
ing air pollution led the New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation to order shutdown of the bankrupt firm's 
incinerator six years later. Using the EPA-owned portable treat-
ment plant, approximately $2 million was spent to dispose of over 
a million gallons of contaminated liquids which had been placed 
in lagoons.63 SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc. submitted the 
low bid of $2.23 million for analysis, transport, treatment and dis-
posal of 21,500 drums of waste.64 
While this $4.23 million total is much less than the $26.574 mil-
lion estimate for the Love Canal, the Pollution Abatement Ser-
vices situation is considered to be far less serious, partly because 
of its isolated location, and partly because fewer dangerous chem-
icals have been found in the 2,700 barrels sampled. A more appro-
priate cost comparison might be the $4.23 million for Pollution 
Abatement Services with the $11.2 million construction costs of 
the Love Canal remedy perhaps, adding, the $800,000 in miscella-
neous costs-I. on Table 1.66 If, however, there are any third-
party costs, the $4.23 million will be an underestimate. 
At first glance, the $26.574 million cost estimate for the Love 
Canal seems quite close to the $25.9 million per site Level II 
treatment estimate given in the Hart Study.68 However, it is diffi-
cult to compare the cost estimates. In both cases, the Hart 
Study's Level II definition is closest to the remedial action being 
II For some examples, see Down in the Dumps, the Ecologist 329 (Dec., 1979); The 
Chemicals Around Us, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1978, at 25-28; From a Kind of Primordial 
Ooze, the Wastes of Modern Industry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1978; Love Canal, U.S.A., N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 21, 1979 (Magazine); Cleaning Up Toxic Waste, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979; 
Health Hazard: Major Risks are Posed by Years of Dumping Industrial Wastes, Wall St. 
J., May 22, 1979, at 1; Polluters Should Pay, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION, June, 1979, at 16-18; 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
(1978) . 
•• New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and Buffalo Evening 
News, July 6, 1979 . 
•• The federal money came from the Coast Guard Revolving Fund. Telephone conversa-
tion with EPA representative in Atlanta . 
.. In July, 1979, the State Legislature had appropriated $750,000 to dispose of the 
drums, compared with the $2.23 million needed. On April 3, 1980, Governor Hugh Carey 
vetoed a $1.5 million appropriation in the 1980-81 budget for cleanup of hazardous wastes 
in Oswego County. U.P.I. Release, Apr. 4, 1980. 
•• See Table I, supra note 40 . 
•• See text at notes 15-22, supra. 
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taken. However, the Hart Study estimates do not appear to in-
clude the health testing and relocation costs, listed as parts C, D, 
E, F, G, and H in Table J.G7 Presumably, any long-term monitor-
ing costs are included in the Hart Study Level II estimates. Such 
monitoring costs are not included in the cost figures for the Love 
Canal, and probably not in the Pollution Abatement Service 
figures. Thus, while these cost figures really are not comparable, 
it can be concluded that they are underestimates, since none-or 
only some, for the Love Canal-of the third-party costs are 
included. 
Even present attempts to provide safe disposal methods for 
hazardous wastes are under attack. For example, Niagara County, 
New York has two firms which have received approval from the 
State's Department of Environmental Conservation as com-
mercial hazardous waste management facilities. liS These firms, 
CECOS International, Inc. which was Newco Chemical Waste 
Systems, Inc. prior to January 1, 1980 and SCA Chemical Waste 
Services, Inc., treat chemical wastes for about half of the United 
States. Their methods are more sophisticated than were used for 
the Love Canal. For instance, many dangerous chemicals are neu-
tralized by reacting with other chemicals, and storage pits are 
lined with plastic and covered with a clay cap when full. Some 
waste chemicals are also processed for use as a liquid industrial 
fuel. 
Problems have arisen, however. Homes are located about one-
half mile from CECO's 385 acre site. A creek flows through part 
of the site, which includes marshy lowland in a federal flood 
hazards area. In addition to odor complaints by local residents, 
EPA recently found that leachate from one of CECOS' secure 
lan4fills was above approved levels. 
SCA's 630 acre facility is not as close to residential areas, but 
odors have still been a source of complaint. Accidental spills have 
also been a problem. EPA is concerned about the fact that SCA 
does not store PCB's in watertight buildings. Thus, even current 
efforts to prevent future Love Canals may be inadequate. 
The descriptions above give some background regarding types 
6. See Table I, supra note 40. 6. Information on the two sites is included in the Interagency Task Force on Hazardous 
Wastes, Draft Report 11-78-11-90, 11-87-11-88; and in Michael Desmond, Niagara 
Nightmare, Buffalo Courier-Express Sunday, June 17,1979. Both sites are near the city of 
Niagara Falls. 
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of chemical waste disposal problems, with some information re-
garding cleanup costs. However, before a corrective or ameliora-
tive policy can be suggested, it is necessary to explore the laws 
relevant to the problem. 
V. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION RELATED TO HAZARDOUS 
WASTES 
A. Existing Legislation 
The legislation with great potential impact is the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), passed in October, 
1976.69 In addition to emphasizing conservation rather than dis-
posal of resources, and improved disposal of all solid wastes, 
RCRA calls for the development of regulations to identify and 
manage all hazardous wastes from generation to disposal includ-
ing treatment, transportation, and storage.60 
EPA was to formulate these regulations by April 21, 1978, but 
the first ones were not promulgated until February 26, 1980.61 
These regulations require generators of hazardous wastes to keep 
records of all toxic wastes that are sent to off-site treatment, stor-
age, or disposal facilities, after appropriate packaging and label-
ling.62 These regulations also require that transporters of hazard-
ous waste continue the record keeping started by generators, and 
deliver the waste to the designated facility.63 In the event of a 
discharge of the wastes being transported, the transporter is re-
•• Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-
6987 (1977) amends the 1965 Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 
(Oct. 20, 1965), which had been strengthened by the 1970 Resource Recovery Act, Pub. L. 
No. 91-512, 89 Stat. 1227 (Oct. 26, 1970). 
8. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6930 (1977) . 
• , Id. § 6921. EPA was more active in finding and assessing damages from hazardous 
waste sites before the passage of RCRA. The emphasis then shifted to drafting the regula-
tions. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 95th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 305-07 (1978)(Testimony of H. B. Kaufman, EPA). The February regulations issued 
were Standards Applicable to Generators of Hazardous Wastes, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,724 (1980) 
(to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 262) and Standards Applicable to Transporters of Hazardous 
Wastes, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,737 (1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 263). These regulations 
become effective August 26, 1980, but the compliance date has not yet been determined. 
Some lesser RCRA regulations were issued in 1979: Development and Implementation of 
Solid Waste Management Plans, 44 Fed. Reg. 45,066 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 
256) and Criteria for Classification of Solid Waste Disposal Facilities, 44 Fed. Reg. 53,438 
(1979)(to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 257) . 
•• 40 C.F.R. § 262 . 
• s 40 C.F.R. § 263. 
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sponsible for cleanup, and for reporting the spill to the Depart-
ment of Transportation. 
However, the crucial regulations listing hazardous wastes and 
giving standards for operating hazardous waste facilities were not 
announced until May 5, 1980." RCRA encourages states to estab-
lish their own regulations. ea Prior to the announcement of EPA 
guidelines, however, states were reluctant to act; if their regula-
tions turned out to be weaker than those of EPA, costly revisions 
would be needed. On the other hand, if some states had regula-
tions more stringent than the federal ones, they might lose indus-
try to states with minimal restrictions on hazardous waste dis-
posal. New Jersey, and California are among the few states with 
comprehensive regulations on hazardous chemicals.88 Several 
states, such as New York, Kentucky, and Wisconsin have laws 
which will use the EPA regulations when they become effective 
on November 19, 1980.87 Delay in issuing the regulations 
stemmed both from EPA's concern that the guidelines are legally 
sound, and from the shortage of technical knowledge in the haz-
ardous waste field.88 It may also be relevant to note that in Sep-
tember, 1978, only 161 of EPA's nearly 11,000 employees were as-
.. Wall St. J., May 6, 1980, at 2; 45 Fed. Reg. 33066-33588 (1980) . 
•• Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, subtitle C, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 6921-80 (1977) . 
.. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 7.26-1.4(West); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-606 (West 
Supp. 1980). After New Jersey passed its laws, 65-70 percent of its hazardous waste was 
shipped to Pennsylvania (which has less stringent laws). Hearing Before the Subcommit-
tee on Oversight and Investigations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 344 (1979) . 
.. N.Y. LAW § 9557-A (McKinney); Kv.REv.STAT. § 224.252 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1978); 
WIS.STAT. § 144.62 (West Supp. 1980) EPA views Section 7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. 
6973, as a last resort, with states bearing primary responsibility for emergency action to 
combat imminent hazards. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 326-338 (1978)(testimony of H.B. Kaufman, EPA). Otherwise, 
EPA must divert funds from its regulatory enforcement budget into cleanup activities. 
Under § 7003 of RCRA, the imminent hazards provision, the Justice Department had filed 
seventeen civil cases by April, 1980 compared with seven in June, 1979. Hazardous Wastes 
Control Efforts, op. cit. p. 6; "Polluters Should Pay," op. cit. p. 17 . 
.. This delay has led to suits against EPA filed in U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia: Illinois v. CostIe, No. 78-1689 (D.D.C.,); Environmental Defense Funds, Inc. v. 
Steffan Plehn, No. 78-1715 (D.D.C.,); Citizens for a Better Environment v. Coatle, No. 78-
1734 (D.D.C.,); National Solid Wastes Management Association v. CoatIe, No. 78-1899 
(D.D.C.,). On January 3, 1979, the court found that EPA had been conscientious in its 
efforts and ordered that the regulations be promulgated in final form not later than Janu-
ary 31, 1980, a deadline which was not met. 
There has been substantial criticism of the delays, as illustrated in the SUBCOMMIT'l'EE 
ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 96th CONG., 1st SESS., HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL RE-
PORT (Comm. Print, 1979). 
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signed to hazardous wastes although others work on industrial 
discharges, industrial air pollution, the Toxic Substance Control 
Act,69 and research.70 This staff worked with about 2 percent of 
the EPA's budget.71 
Once RCRA has been implemented, it may have substantial 
impact.72 For example, those owning or operating facilities to 
treat or store hazardous wastes will be required to obtain a per-
mit; non-conforming disposers may have their permits revoked.73 
There will be civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance with 
the law.7• Sections 7002 and 7003 state that anyone may start a 
citizen suit against those in violation of the Act, and the Act's 
administrator may bring suit to prohibit the handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any hazardous waste cre-
ating imminent danger to public health or the environment.711 
Other legislation related to toxic wastes include: the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 197276 which has as 
its purpose to control pesticides in waterways; the Clean Air Acts 
•• 15 V.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (1980) . 
•• Michael Desmond, EPA Slow in Fighting Waste Peril, Buffalo Courier-Express, Sept. 
17, 1978. 
11 For October I, 1978 through September 30, 1979, EPA's budget was $1.2 billion, with 
$25.2 million for hazardous wastes. Of the $25.2 million, about $15 million went to states 
to help them examine hazardous waste problems. 
EPA has now asked for more staff and funds to deal with this problem. Most recently, 
EPA requested $45 million to finance the work of its new agency task force to probe toxic 
waste sites; $20 million would be used to find and assess sites, $23 million for cleanup 
activities and $2 million for enforcement by the Justice Department. Buffalo Evening 
News, July 12, 1979 . 
•• RCRA could be relatively ineffective, too. Concern has been expressed that EPA's 
definition of hazardous wastes may omit many known toxic substances, perhaps due to 
enforcement cost considerations. Hearing Before The Subcommittee on Oversight and In-
vestigations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 368-70, 405-07, 450-56 (1978). According to EPA esti-
mates, 10 to 15 percent of the 334 million metric tons per year of industrial wastes will be 
classified as hazardous, under RCRA. Companies generating less than 100 kilograms of 
waste per month (no matter how toxic it might be) would not be covered by RCRA. CONGo 
Q., Mar. 22, 1980, at 799. The excluded companies account for 91 percent of all hazardous 
waste generators, but only about 1 percent of what EPA defines as hazardous wastes. Buf-
falo Courier-Express, May 6, 1980, at 2. 
The overlap with other acts administered by EPA and the multiplicity of divisions 
within EPA (each with its own generally defined responsibility) has apparently delayed 
the drafting of the regulations and may hinder the implementation of RCRA . 
•• 42 V.S.C.A. § 6925 (1977) . 
•• Id. § 6928 . 
•• Id. §§ 6972,6973. However, EPA must show that a significant hazard exists. CONGo Q., 
Mar. 22, 1980, at 797 . 
•• 7 V.S.C.A. § 136 (1980). 
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of 1970 and 197777 which establish air quality standards and regu-
late pollutant emissions; and the Hazardous Materials Transpor-
tation Act of 197478 which regulates equipment and methods in 
the commercial movement of flammable and combustible materi-
als, poisons, oxidizing or corrosive materials, compressed gases, 
and corrosives. 
The Clean Water Act of 1977 set up regulations to enforce 
clean water standards.78 Section 311 authorizes a revolving fund 
to pay for spills of oil and 297 hazardous wastes, and EPA has an 
enforceable right to recover costs from polluters.8o However, the 
Section 311 regulations apply only to navigable waters, not to air, 
land or ground water. Section 504 is designed to provide assis-
tance whenever released contaminants may present imminent and 
substantial danger to public health or welfare, but Congress has 
never appropriated money to implement this.81 
The Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976 (TSCA) provides for 
direct control of new and existing chemicals.82 If a chemical in-
volves unreasonable risk, then EPA can limit or prohibit its man-
ufacture, processing, distribution, use and disposal. 83 The Act re-
quires corporations to send EPA data on expected effects on 
people of new chemicals planned for the market. U Only a very 
small portion of the chemicals in use have been tested at this 
point however.811 
.. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401·7642 (West Supp. 1979). 
71 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801·1812 (1976, West Supp. 1980). 
7. Pub. L. No. 92·500, 86 Stat. 816 (Oct. 18, 1972); 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (1978). 
Since the remedial action at the Love Canal involves a small sewer system, Congressman 
John J. LaFalce attempted to use Section 201, which provides grants for construction of 
wastewater treatment facilities, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1281 (1978). EPA, however, decided that 
this would not fit the intent of 201 funds, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 82 (1978). 
10 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (1978). As part of the implementation of section 311, the National 
Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan was developed by the Council 
on Environmental Quality. 40 C.F.R. § 1510 (1979). The final revision became effective 
March 19, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 17,832-60 (1980). The plan calls for coordination between 
federal and state efforts, with funding from government agencies and the U.S. Coast 
Guard revolving fund, and applies only to spills of at least 1,000 gallons of oil or hazardous 
substances in navigable waters or on their shoreline. 
11 33 U.S.C.A. § 1364 (1978). 
II 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (1979). 
II Id. § 2605 . 
.. Id. § 2604. 
II Less than 10 percent of the chemicals in use have even been tested for carcinogenic-
ity. Public Apathy Toward Chemical Risks is Perilous, Conservation FoundatioR Letter, 
2, Sept., 1978, at 2. The percentage tested for other health effects is probably smaller. 
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TSCA is designed to regulate which chemicals can be used by 
industry, while RCRA is designed to regulate what happens to 
these chemicals after use. As mentioned above, there have been 
several implementation delays. Unfortunately, RCRA is silent on 
inactive chemical dumpsites except in cases where EPA can iden-
tify the owner and prove in court that the site is a health hazard. 
It is a preventive program, designed to deal with hazardous 
wastes generated now and in the future.8s 
B. Pending Legislation 
For abandoned waste sites, often there are no financial re-
sources available to compensate for the environmental, health, 
and economic damage associated with the problem. It is essential 
to recall at this point the Hart Study estimate that 64 percent of 
hazardous waste sites are privately owned but financially non-
viable.87 Several bills have recently been introduced in Congress 
in an attempt to remedy this aspect of the hazardous waste prob-
lem at the national level. A number of states are also considering 
or have taken action.88 
The Administration proposed superfund legislation: the Oil, 
Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Waste Response, Liability, 
and Compensation Act.8e The bill's major thrust is to require the 
responsible parties for toxic waste pollution to bear the costs of 
cleanup, and would apply to oil spills, spills of hazardous sub-
stances, releases from abandoned or inactive dumps except those 
with permits under RCRA, and any releases creating imminent 
.. However, section 8001(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6981 (1977), which provides for demonstra-
tion projects, was the basis of $4 million in funding for the Love Canal. Section 7003, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 6973 (1977), on imminent hazards, could also apply to abandoned dumps. An-
other $4 million for the Love Canal resulted from the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5121-5202 (1976). This was the first time that relief from a manmade disaster 
was funded under this act. 
•• See note 5, supra . 
.. For example, New York State recently appropriated $300,000 to locate and study 
toxic waste disposal sites; the measure also empowers state officials to order cleanup or to 
carry out inactive hazardous waste disposal site remedial actions. Buffalo Evening News, 
June 27, 1979. New Jersey has combined state funds with an EPA grant to set up a haz-
ardous waste strike force. [d. June 28, 1979 . 
•• This legislation includes the Toxic Waste and Tort Act, H.R. 3797, 95th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., (1979) and the Hazardous Materials Control and Compensation Act, H.R. 3798, 95th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., (1979), both introduced by John J. LaFalce. H.R. 4566, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 125 CONGo REc. No. 89 p. H4957 (1979) (introduced on June 21, 1979, by Mr. John-
son of California). 
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danger to public health or welfare.90 
Eighty percent of the Administration-proposed superfund 
would come from fees on the production of petroleum, petro-
chemicals, and inorganic chemicals, with the remainder paid by 
federal, state and local governments.91 Upon discovery o(danger 
from an abandoned hazardous waste site, $300,000 of emergency 
assistance would be available for things such as provision of 
drinking water and evacuation of residents.9! Two hundred thou-
sand dollars from the superfund would be available for first-year 
containment of the waste.98 Mter that, the state would bear the 
costs, and would have to oversee, and possibly finance, the main-
tenance of the site for nineteen years.94 The government would, 
however, be able to try to recover costs from those owners, les-
sees, and operators of abandoned sites who contributed to the re-
lease of toxic materials. Prior owners, generators or disposers 
would also be liable. Liability would be limited to $50 million per 
hazardous waste-related accident.911 The Administration's 
superfund bill has limited compensation features, and no retroac-
tivity.98 Reimbursement for personal injury and property damage 
would be limited to spills from leaking oil tankers or overturned 
10 Id. § 603-604. Combining oil and hazardous substances has led to jurisdictional dis-
putes among Congressional committees. James J. Florio, D.-N.J., has introduced H.R. 
5790, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., to deal with cleanup of hazardous waste dump sites, and spe-
cifically exempted oil spills and chemical spills into navigable waters. CONGo Q., Mar. 28, 
1980, at 797. The Chemical Manufacturers Association was successful in its effort to have 
the "strict liability" and joint and several liability clauses modified. CMA also argues that 
only abandoned inactive sites should be included and that funding for these sites should 
not be provided by industry, but that chemical manufacturers would clean up their own 
waste disposal sites. 1 INSIDE E.P.A. No.4, at 2-3, 8-10 (1980). 
II H.R. 4566 § 606, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., (1979). Fees would be up to 3 cents per barrel 
on oil and up to one half cent per pound on raw materials used to make the chemicals 
which involve hazardous wastes. This may be leu effective than earlier versions introduced 
by John J. Lafalce of New York (H.R. 3797, H.R. 3798) since the Administration bills' 
fees are based on products not on the volume and toxicity of wastes as in the LaFalce 
bills. The program would be phased in gradually, with $250 million in fees and appropria-
tions the first year, $375 million the second year, and $500 million each of the next two 
years. The program would be reviewed before a decision about extending it beyond four 
years. 
" Id. § 601 (g). 
tta Id. § 603(b) . 
.. Id. 
··Id. § 604 • 
.. H.R. 4566 § 607, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., CONGo REC. (1979). On the other hand, the 
LaFalce bills, see note 91 supra, would compensate all persons, up to $50,000 each, who 
are physically injured by toxic pollutants. Compensation would include medical benefits, 
rehabilitation benefits, and up to 80 percent of lost wages. H.R. 3797 § 3226, Congo Sess .. 
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trucks transporting toxic chemicals. However, those hurt econom-
ically by the sites, such as fishermen in the oil spill example, 
would receive limited compensation for loss of livelihood. Victims 
of abandoned waste sites would not be compensated for medical 
expenses, or for loss of property or jobs. 
The Eckhardt bill-the Hazardous Waste Act of 1980-calls for 
an inventory of hazardous waste sites, which would help each 
state rank its inactive hazardous waste dumps, according to their 
threat to public health or the environment.97 With the state rank-
ing, EPA would annually designate 100 inactive sites having the 
greatest danger as "top priority sites."98 The Eckhardt bill en-
courages states to plan a hazardous waste program in order to be 
eligible for 95 percent federal funding for cleanup of abandoned 
hazardous waste sites. An approved state plan would require 
monitoring of up to fifty years, which is longer than in other 
pending legislation, and would also require the availability within 
the state of adequate hazardous waste disposal facilities.99 
The Eckhardt bill authorizes a five year, $1 billion fund for 
cleanup activities of sites which are abandoned or have owners 
who are unable to finance cleanup. The bill contains no personal 
injury provisions for sites abandoned before 1980. For active sites 
or inactive sites which are financially solvent, court action would 
be taken against generators, transporters, previous and present 
site owners and operators to force cleanup or recover cleanup 
costs. For wastes generated after January 1, 1980, the generators 
would be responsible for injury damages, including personal in-
jury, property damages, and economic or noneconomic loss, for as 
long as the wastes remain hazardous. loo Generators of hazardous 
wastes would pay fees based on the danger of treatment, storage, 
or disposal of the waste. The fees would be used to satisfy damage 
claims and for operation of approved state hazardous waste 
programs.101 
The House Public Works Committee approved a bill-H.R. 
85-to set up a $200 million fund to clean up oil spills and a $100 
million fund for chemical spill cleanup.l02 The oil cleanup fund 
.7 H.R. 6931 §§ 2 & 4(b), (introduced March 26, 1980) . 
•• [d. § 4(b) . 
.. [d. 
100 [d. § 4(c). 
,., [d. § 4(c) & 4(e). 
,.2 CONGo Q., April 26, 1980, at 1143, and May 10, 1980 at 1236. 
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would be financed by a three-cent-per-barrel oil fee, and the 
chemical cleanup money would come from the chemical industry, 
largely based on the toxicity of chemicals produced. Victims who 
suffered economic losses from oil or chemical spills could be com-
pensated, but there would be liability limits for oil and chemical 
companies. The bill does not include abandoned hazardous waste 
sites, since the committee has jurisdiction only over navigable 
waterways. 
The Florio bill-H.R. 7020-on the other hand, would set up a 
$600 million four-year cleanup fund for inactive or abandoned 
toxic waste dumps, with a 50-50 sharing of costs between industry 
and government. lOS The bill includes a $35 million authorization 
for EPA to prepare a priority list of inactive waste sites through-
out the nation, and requires monitoring of potentially harmful 
sites. EPA would be able to clean up hazardous leaks that 
threaten public health or the environment, if the responsible par-
ties could not or would not do so. Once the responsible companies 
had been identified, EPA could sue for recovery of cleanup costs. 
Liability would be limited by apportioning damages according to 
the amount caused by each company. At least 10 percent of 
EPA's cleanup costs would be paid by the state where the dump 
is located, and states would be responsible for long-term mainte-
nance of the sites plus provision of adequate disposal sites. In the 
May 13, 1980 markup session, the House Commerce Committee 
deleted a section enabling individuals who suffered personal or 
property damages to sue the responsible parties in federal 
court.I04 Even if passed, the bill may be relatively ineffective since 
industry's share of the fund is tied to the amount appropriated 
for the government's share. 
The Senate response to the Administration superfund proposal 
is the Culver-Muskie bill,lOII which would cover discharges of any 
,.s CONGo Q., May 3, 1980, at 1181-82 and May 17, 1980 at 1355-56. H.R. 7020 is a 
compromise version of an earlier measure, H.R. 5790, which had a $1.3 billion superfund 
with a larger share from industry, and held all companies contributing to a dumpsite 
equally responsible for all cleanup costs. 
, .. After passage by the House Commerce Committee, H.R. 7020 was referred to the 
Ways and Means Committee, where committee Chairman Al Ullman (D.-Ore.), received a 
thirty day referral on May 20 CONGo Q., May 24, 1980, at 1399. 
'.1 S. 1480 was drafted jointly by the Environmental Pollution Subcommittee and the 
Resources Protection Subcommittee, which sent the bill to the Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee on May 22; Wall St. J., May 23,1980, at 5. The information here 
is based on a February I, 1980 Staff Working Paper and CONGo Q., June 7, 1980, at 1585-
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hazardous substance into the environment-including those per-
mitted under other pollution control laws. In this more compre-
hensive proposal, $700 million of the superfund would be based 
upon fees paid by importers, manufacturers, and generators of 
hazardous chemicals, with a federal contribution of $100 mil-
lion.106 The emergency fund could be used for evacuation of re-
sidents and emergency containment of chemicals, as well as per-
manent relocation of residents and chemical containment or 
removal. Compensation to victims would include medical costs, 
property damage, impairment in earning capacity, and other 
losses.107 Victims could sue in federal court to recover damages 
from chemical companies for medical expenses; more liberal rules 
of evidence would reduce the burden of proving that an injury 
had been caused by the discharge, release, or disposal of hazard-
ous substances.108 
The chemical industry and dump site operators would contrib-
ute to a $200 million fund to pay for incidents at inactive dumps 
after they have been closed for five years. Owner liability would 
be limited to five years, and a $50 million limit is proposed on 
liability for all victim damage caused by a single incident.1oe As in 
the Florio bill, liability is limited to the portion of the release or 
damages contributed by the company. 
The debate surrounding the legislative proposals discussed 
above centers around four basic issues: (1) the scope of the legis-
lation (Should all abandoned sites be included, or only some of 
them? Should all hazardous discharges, including oil and radioac-
tive wastes, be covered from all potential sources, such as work-
places, in addition to waste sites? Should the law cover emer-
gency measures only, or long term cleanup, and how much money 
should be spent?); (2) liability (Should the strict, joint and sev-
eral liability clause be weakened to apply only in negligence 
cases? Should firms be liable for hazardous waste disposal that 
was acceptable at the time of practice but is now illegal or is now 
86. The full committee is expected to act on this bill during June, 1980, and President 
Carter has expressed support for this version of the superfund. Buffalo Courier-Express, 
June 12, 1980, at 24. 
106 s. 1480 § 5. 
'.7 Id. § 4(a). 
'06 Id. § 4(c). Presently unacceptable evidence such as animal studies and health studies 
for small population groups would be allowed . 
• 01 This substantially weakens the joint, several, and strict liability section in earlier 
versions of S. 1480. 
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causing or will cause discharges?); (3) compensation (Should vic-
tims be compensated at all? If so, should they be compensated for 
property damage, illness, or loss of earnings, and for how long?); 
(4) funding sources (Should taxpayers pay for this effort, or 
should industry, or both? If industry is to bear some of the costs, 
which sectors will pay? Should generators who dispose of hazard-
ous wastes properly be required to help pay for the problems cre-
ated by careless firms?). Resolution of these issues will not be 
easy, since such a resolution depends upon existing laws, eco-
nomic considerations, value judgements, and political feasibility. 
Hopefully, the legislative proposals will be combined and 
streamlined before a final form becomes law. The present infla-
tion-and-recession mood in Washington implies that limits will be 
placed on the funds available for cleanup and compensation in 
hazardous waste situations. Even $500 million per year in a 
superfund means it will take a long time to meet the $3.9 billion 
costs for short term solutions estimated in the Hart Study, 110 and 
the permanent solution cost estimates were $44.1 billion. This 
means that EPA and the states will have to set priorities, and 
some hazardous waste problems will have to wait until money be-
comes available. People who are affected by the sites placed on 
"hold" will still be suffering physical and economic damages. The 
insurance program proposed below could help while they wait for 
corrective action. People near sites which are being cleaned up 
are likely to find that compensation falls far short of their costs, 
either because certain types of costs are not compensated under 
the resulting legislation, or because relatively low limits are 
placed on the amount of compensation which victims may receive. 
The proposed insurance program could help them recover more of 
their costs. Since the proposal stemmed from a study of the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), a review of its features 
follows. 
VI. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended by the 
Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, III provided a low cost flood 
insurance program for buildings and contents in coastal and riv-
110 See note 5, supra. 
111 Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (Aug. 1, 1968); Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975 
(Dec. 31, 1973); 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 2414, 4001-4128 (1977). 
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erine areas. m This program. was enacted in response to the fact 
that federal flood control works and disaster relief had not 
stopped the rise in annual flood losses, and communities were still 
encouraging development in floodplains. us In the "emergency" 
phase of the program, the Federal Insurance Administration pro-
vided each community with a preliminary Flood Hazard Bound-
ary Map.ll4 For communities which participate in this emergency 
phase, or first step, of the program, structures are insurable at 
subsidized rates regardless of risk. llll 
The subsidy lowered the rate to about 10 percent of the actua-
rial or real risk rate. In addition to providing insurance, a goal of 
the program. was to regulate development in floodplains. So, in 
order to qualify for the emergency program, a community must 
have required: (a) building permits; (b) anchoring of buildings in 
flood-prone areas; (c) construction techniques and materials to 
minimize flood damage in flood-prone areas; (d) adequate drain-
age in new subdivisions; and (e) design or placement of new util-
111 The information in this section is drawn from the following sources: Budget of the 
U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1980, Appendix 895-99 (1980); Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, Questions and Answers: National Flood Insurance Program (1979); 
Platt, National Flood Insurance Program: Some Midstream Perspectives, AM. INST. OF 
PLANNERS, J., July, 1976, at 303-13 and the Federal Insurance Administration. 
Similar programs include the Federal Crop Insurance Programs (administered by 
U.S.D.A., for such things as hail damage), crime insurance and riot reinsurance programs 
Title XI-Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 (administered by 
H.U.D.). 
111 For example, in 1972 tropical storm Agnes took 123 lives, displaced 250,000 people, 
and accounted for over $1 billion in property loss. With less than a one percent probability 
of such a storm returning in any given year, Eloise hit the same region in 1975, with $228 
million in damage. By 1973, federal disaster relief outlays had grown to $2.5 billion, Platt, 
supra note 112, at 303, partly as a compassionate response to the fact that flood insurance 
premiums from private insurance companies were too high to be affordable. 
1lf Reorg. Plan No.3 of 1978, § 202, 43 Fed. Reg. 41943 transferred the National Flood 
Insurance Program from the Department of Housing and Urban Development to the Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency, effective March 25, 1979. Budget of the U.S. Gov-
ernment, Fiscal Year 1980, Appendix 896 (1980). 
111 42 U.S.C.A. § 4056 (1977). The minimum annual premium is $25. Residential rates 
per $100 of coverage are $.25 for structures and $.35 for contents. Nonresidential rates are 
higher (up to $.75 per $100 of coverage). In the emergency program, the upper limit is 
lower than in the regular program (e.g., $45,000 for a single family home and its contents 
compared with $245,000 under the regular program). Id. § 4013. There is a $200 deductible 
clause for buildings and another $200 for contents. Tenants may also insure their personal 
property. Flood insurance is purchased through commercial insurance brokers. Id. §§ 4051, 
4052, 4081, 4082. Items not coverable include such things as storage tanks, docks, growing 
crops, shrubs, land, livestock, roads and motor vehicles. 
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ity systems to prevent flood loss. 118 
During the emergency phase, a detailed on-site survey was 
made to yield a floodplain map showing different risk zones ac-
cording to elevation.ll7 This Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) 
was used in the "regular" program to determine insurance rates 
by zone according to the risk for a particular location.1l8 Under 
the regular program, property could be insured for larger 
amounts. In turn, the communities' flood plain management ac-
tivities became more comprehensive in accordance with the de-
tailed map. New buildings could not be put in high risk areas, 
and were to be elevated or floodproofed in lesser risk areas.l18 
Communities have an incentive to participate in the NFIP, 
since structures in the floodplain may not be eligible for any fed-
erally-connected financing, such as Federal Housing Administra-
tion, or Veterans Administration loans, EPA grants, or conven-
tional mortgages from a bank or savings and loan association that 
is regulated or insured by the federal government, if the commu-
nity is not in the program.110 Failure to participate also makes the 
flood prone area ineligible for any federal funds, including disas-
ter relief, to develop or improve property.lI1 
Implementation of the regular phase of the NFIP has pro-
ceeded more slowly than anticipated, because of the necessity of 
making accurate flood plain maps. 111 The mapping effort has 
proved to be a very expensive, lengthy process.113 There has been 
some debate as to the definition of an acceptable probability of 
flood damage so that various zones could be delineated within the 
II. [d. §§ 4022, 4102. 
117 [d. § 4101. 
"" [d. §§ 4014, 4015. About 16,100 communities have joined the emergency program. Of 
these, approximately 1,500 have now qualified for the regular phase. However, 54 percent 
of the policies are in the regular program. 
"" The NFIP may save $1.7 billion per year in flood damages by the year 2000. I.. When the community is in the program, some of this financing may require flood 
insurance for a particular property. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4012b, 4106b (1977). 
III [d. §§ 4012a, 4106a. 
, •• Constitutionality was also an iBBue. Floodplain restrictions "(1) must be clearly re-
lated to protection of the public health, safety, and welfare; (2) ... must not be confisca-
tory; and (3) ... must not be unreasonably discriminatory." Platt, supra note 112, at 306. 
The confiscation criterion can be particularly difficult, if it essentially makes the owner a 
holder of worthleBB land. I.. In the 1968 legislation, the mapping was scheduled for completion by 1983. Even in 
1976, costs were up to $5,000 per atream mile. About one-third of the maps had been 
completed by mid-1979; most of the reat were in proceBB. $114 million was authorized for 
NFIP atudies in 1979. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4127 (West Supp. 1980). 
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detailed maps.114 Another point of contention has been the rates 
established for each zone. The original 1968 legislation required 
actuarial rates for all construction started after the community 
received its preliminary Flood Hazard Boundary Map. This had 
the effect of making almost all new construction ineligible for 
flood insurance, until the 1973 amendments which allowed insur-
ance on new structures at subsidized rates until the FIRM was 
issued. 111 The delays in completing the FIRM's negated much of 
the regulatory aspect of the prograni, since the community con-
struction requirements could be less stringent during the emer-
gency phase. 
In April, 1979, there were nearly 1.5 million NFIP policies in 
force, totalling over $53 billion of coverage for flood-prone prop-
erty. For this insurance, almost $115 million in annual premiums 
was collected. III During the first four months of 1979, over 11,000 
claims were paid, totalling $44 million (with 12,000 claims pend-
ing as of April 30). For the previous year, 1.4 million policies had 
about $49 billion in coverage, with $108 million in premiums col-
lected. During that year, 28,651 claims were paid, totalling $136 
million.117 Administrative costs for the insurance aspects of the 
NFIP are estimated to be around $12 million per year. The major 
costs, however, approximately $85 million per year, arise from the 
mapping efforts involving over 300 people and from education 
about flooding and hurricanes. 
In the following section, it will be noted that there are similari-
ties between flood damage and the damages created by aban-
doned hazardous waste dumps, at least with respect to the indi-
viduals affected. There are also reasons to assert that private 
provision of insurance to compensate individuals would be no 
more feasible for abandoned hazardous waste sites than for flood-
prone areas. Given the gaps in existing legislation and the uncer-
tainties surrounding the adoption of any of the pending legisla-
tion, it can be argued that a program and commitment similar to 
the NFIP would substantially alleviate the problems associated 
.. 4 Platt, supra note 112, at 307-09 . 
• 1. Pub. L. No. 93-234, § 103, 87 Stat. 975 (Dec. 31, 1973). 
... Half of the premiums were for the subsidized emergency policies . 
• 1. The approximate equality of premiums to claims payments reflects the shift to actu-
arial rates as communities become part of the regular program. During the period 1973-
1978, the federal subsidy varied from a high of 63 percent of the flood insurance costs to a 
low of 37 percent. Flood loaeea are financed by borrowing from a revolving fund (up to 
$500 million) for the excess over premiums. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4017 (1977). 
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with abandoned hazardous waste dumps, although currently used 
toxic waste sites could also be included in such a program. 
VII. A POLICY PROPOSAL: NATIONAL HAZARDOUS WASTE 
INSURANCE PROGRAM 
At the present time, individuals and communities which suffer 
damages from abandoned toxic waste dumps must rely upon spe-
cific legislation for disaster relief for each situation.128 The delays 
while waiting for legislative action lengthen the period of uncer-
tainty facing the people affected, and may increase their mone-
tary costs as well as the psychic costs associated with the prob-
lem. Some people are fortunate enough to work, reside, and own 
property only in areas which are not susceptible to toxic waste 
pollution. Other individuals may refuse to engage in any activities 
in areas known to have the potential for hazardous waste leakage. 
However, this refusal could be very expensive, depending upon 
the particular circumstances. In addition, many people may have 
imperfect information at the time of decision. For instance, cus-
tomers looking at the new houses around the Love Canal were not 
told that hazardous wastes were buried nearby. These considera-
tions support the argument that damages from abandoned toxic 
waste dumps are largely beyond the individual's control in much 
the same way that an earthquake or a flood is. 129 
Even if proposed hazardous waste legislation is adopted, com-
pensation for physical, economic livelihood and property damages 
is likely to have relatively low upper limits.130 This means there 
... A clear example of this is the series of actions taken in the New York State Legisla-
ture to deal specifically with the Love Canal. Congress also took specific funding action for 
the Love Canal, as discussed in an earlier section. See text at notes 38-48, supra. 
••• Yet individuals do avoid d&nl8ges from these natural events by building above the 
lowest flood plains or away from the worst fault lines, or by using construction materials 
and design which will withstand the stresses of these disasters. Complete damage preven-
tion would eliminate the use of huge amounts of otherwise desirable land or would require 
substantially more expensive construction in order to avoid what may be a low probability 
disaster. So, based upon lack of knowledge or upon calculation of low expected damages, 
development has continued in these hazard-prone areas. 
This lack of knowledge or errors in the calculation of expected damages has, as dis-
cussed in the previous section, led to very large disaster losses, many of which could have 
been prevented. See text at notes 111-127, supra. Tying the availability of flood or earth-
quake insurance to control over development in these hazard-prone areas can reduce fu-
ture damages. The assumption is that the government has or can get more complete 
knowledge to more correctly assess expected damages in these areas. 
110 Much of the pending legislation remains silent regarding abandoned hazardous waste 
dumps. 
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will be no mechanism which the individual can use to protect 
himself from such damage or from the excess of costs over com-
pensation resulting from pending legislation. The policy sug-
gested here gives the individual a way to protect himself, and 
would increase his range of choice if, for example, an otherwise 
attractive house or job were available in a location which might 
be subject to hazardous waste seepage.131 It would also provide 
the option for individual protection in situations where the dan-
ger of toxic waste was discovered after taking the job or purchas-
ing the house. 
Before discussing the features of a National Hazardous Waste 
Insurance Program (NHWIP), the rationale for government in-
volvement in insurance provision will be reviewed. The NFIP will 
be evaluated against this rationale, which will then be used as an 
indication of the appropriateness of government involvement in a 
hazardous waste insurance program. 
The argument supporting government insurance programs is 
based on situations where there are substantial economic burdens 
imposed by occurrence of certain events subject to risk, and 
where private insurers could not accept the risk. Most of the 
growth of government insurance programs can be attributed to 
society's tendency to become more risk-averse, or to have greater 
subjective perceptions of risk.131 When private insurers are unable 
or unwilling to handle certain risk situations, this residual may be 
filled by government insurance. There are additional reasons for 
government insurance, rather than private insurance: conve-
nience; achieving a wider social purpose; necessity for compulsion; 
111 Despite the government subsidy, relatively small numbers of people choose to 
purchase flood insurance. This has been attributed partly to the consumer's lack of infor-
mation with respect to the probability of the disaster occurring and with respect to the 
expected amount of damage the individual would suffer if the disaster should occur. 
Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB. POLICY 227 (1976). 
Consumers frequently do not know of available insurance options. If the consumer's cost 
(of time and effort, plus out-of-pocket costs) of obtaining and evaluating this information 
is considered, it may be that a simplified decision rule is used, rather than the traditional 
utility-maximization procedure. Hence, the individual may not even consider searching for 
more information until a threshold level of awareness is reached and this awareness may 
depend largely on the individual's prior experience (with floods, with others who have 
flood insurance). To increase the number of potential victims covered by insurance, it may 
be necessary to present graphic examples of damage and easily understood explanations of 
the insurance options, or to make insurance mandatory in some circumstances . 
.. " This paragraph relies on Greene, A Review and Evaluation of Selected Government 
Programs to Handle Risk, 43 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 129 (1979). 
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efficiency; and dealing with risks produced by society itself. Na-
tional Flood Insurance meets several of these criteria. (1) Only 
those likely to have flood losses will tend to purchase flood insur-
ance. This will lead to large losses being spread among a small 
number of policy holders, causing such high insurance rates as to 
make these losses generally uninsurable in the market. us (2) Soci-
ety may achieve a broader purpose in controlling development in 
flood-prone areas. (3) Even if they have a high likelihood of flood 
damage, most individuals will not voluntarily buy flood insurance, 
either because they underestimate the risk of damage, or because 
they assume disaster assistance relief will be available if they suf-
fer damage, so that compulsory insurance is required. (4) The 
evolution of the NFIP from a partnership with the National 
Flood Insurers Association to operation under a government con-
trolled corporation in 1978 may reflect convenience and a desire 
to improve efficiency. The NFIP can be justified on the basis that 
many people throughout the nation suffer flood damages. Tax-
payers can be expected to help pay for this risk (which is not 
insurable in the private market) since entire regions may be dis-
rupted by floods, causing indirect losses, yet the requirement for 
insurance assures that those who are directly affected will bear 
some of their own risk costs. 
A similar argument may support a national hazardous waste in-
surance program. Evidence presented in earlier sections showed 
the significant costs of a nationwide hazardous waste site cleanup 
program. At any given point in time, there is some probability 
that one of these sites will create problems, so there is risk. The 
"dawning awareness" of hazardous waste problems has led to 
greater subjective perceptions of risk on the part of many people 
living or working near toxic waste dumps. The fact that private 
insurance programs for hazardous waste site related personal in-
jury and property damage are not available indicates that these 
risks may not be insurable. Since only those likely to suffer toxic 
waste ·damages would tend to purchase such insurance, there 
would be large losses which could not be spread among a large 
number of policy holders, making this unprofitable for private 
insurers. 
A broader social purpose could be accomplished by a NHWIP, 
.. I A few "Difference in Conditions" policies cover floods; comprehensive coverage on 
automobile policies also does. [d. at 139. 
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by regulating development in areas prone to hazardous waste 
damage, so as to reduce future damages. For some individuals, 
compulsory purchase of hazardous waste insurance may be neces-
sary to offset their unrealistically low subjective perception of 
risk, or their assumption that a government bail-out would follow 
any hazardous waste problem. Taxpayers can, perhaps, bt: ex-
pected to help pay for this risk, although this argument is 
stronger with respect to cleanup than for compensation of indi-
vidual personal injury and property loss. A government insurance 
program does not necessarily require taxpayer subsidies, however; 
the NFIP is designed to collect premiums on the basis of actua-
rial risk when the program is fully implemented. A similar feature 
could be included in the NHWIP. An economic efficiency aspect 
of the NHWIP arises from the premiums paid, so that those af-
fected by hazardous waste risks would bear some of their own 
costs. Finally, this program may deal with risks produced by ad-
verse conditions of society itself. The present and future dangers 
from toxic waste dumps resulted from what turned out to be in-
adequate hazardous waste disposal methods. These inadequate 
methods meant lower prices to those purchasing the related prod-
ucts. It seems safe to assume that the purchasers were numerous 
and dispersed throughout society. Hence, it may be claimed that 
society at large, having received the benefits of lower product 
prices, is now responsible for assuming the risks associated with 
previous inadequate disposal methods. 
With the above justification for government assumption of 
some of the risk associated with hazardous waste disposal, the 
next step is to explore how a NHWIP might work, and how it 
would compare with the NFIP. 
It is unlikely that toxic waste insurance premiums would be af-
fordable if provided by private insurance companies. A federal 
program for toxic waste insurance would have the flexibility for 
enough subsidization to be affordable, tied to an incentive for 
communities to limit or regulate the activities near abandoned 
toxic waste sites. Such a program would also have the potential of 
lowering the taxpayer cost of some of the pending legislation; it 
would be reasonable to have fairly low upper limits on compensa-
tion guaranteed to all who meet a legislated damage test, if the 
affected individuals also had the option to recover more of their 
costs through an insurance program. 
For those bills including compensation clauses, this would re-
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duce the size of the superfund needed, or would allow greater 
cleanup effort for the same size superfund. Some of the superfund 
proposals have no compensation features. The NHWIP would be 
a desirable complement to one of these proposals, and a supple-
ment to those bills with compensation features. In addition, those 
who benefit from the insurance program help to pay for it, shift-
ing some of the burden away from the general taxpayer or 
superfund contributor to those who want the toxic waste 
protection. 
Communities in the NFIP must regulate construction by limit-
ing its location and requiring floodproofing of permitted struc-
tures. In a similar manner, under NHWIP, development near haz-
ardous waste storage areas could be prohibited in high risk zones 
and could require preventative construction techniques in lower 
risk zones. Detailed requirements would have to await the draw-
ing of potential impact area maps with zones designating risk ar-
eas. As in the NFIP, the mapping effect would be time-consuming 
and expensive, but would be essential in order to determine the 
risks for any specific location. As in the NFIP, an "emergency 
phase" of the NHWIP could allow subsidized insurance for all 
persons and property in participating communities, regardless of 
risk. To participate in this phase of the NHWIP, the community 
would agree to control development in suspected high-risk areas; 
more stringent controls would apply in the "regular phase." The 
locations of many hazardous waste sites are unknown, either be-
cause dumpers did not realize the potential danger of the materi-
als and kept no records, or because present economic incentives 
for hazardous waste disposers encourage them to hide their activi-
ties. Once the location of a site has been established, however, the 
mapping technology is available.184 The factors considered would 
include airborne movement of toxic vapors, surface runoff, and 
migration of the leachate from chemical waste sites. 
The boundaries of the potential impact areas will be partly de-
termined on an arbitrary basis comparable to the arbitrariness 
used for the definition of a floodplain. In this case, designated 
.. 4 For examples, see Rima, Brown, Goerlitz, & Law, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Poten-
tial Contamination of the Hydrologic Environment from the Pesticide Waste Dumps in 
Hardeman County, Tennessee, (1967) and Sprinkle, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Leachate 
Migration from a Pesticide Waste Disposal Site in Hardeman County, Tennessee (1978), 
reprinted in Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 95th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. at 114-211 (1978). 
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"safe" levels of harmful toxic materials would be used to deline-
ate the boundaries. The "safe" levels would be specified on the 
basis of medical and technical information regarding the effects of 
toxic materials singly and in combination for various concentra-
tions, and on the probability of the wastes escaping from their 
present site. 1311 
Once the potential impact areas have been mapped, with zones 
designating different risks, the insurance premiums could be 
based on actuarial rates, reducing government subsidy of 
NHWIP.136 Within the potential impact areas, zoning regulations 
could preclude certain types of development which might lead to 
higher risks. If, for example, children are more susceptible to 
toxic chemicals than adults, schools could be prohibited in the 
higher risk zones. 
The cost to taxpayers of this toxic waste insurance program will 
depend upon a number of factors. These include but are not lim-
ited to: (a) the types of coverage which are part of the program, 
such as physical injury, property damage, loss of livelihood, 
mental anguish, funds for corrective action for an entire commu-
nity; (b) upper limits on each type of coverage;137 ~c) the premium 
rates charged for each type of coverage; (d) the number and size 
of potential impact areas which essentially determines the poten-
tial number of insurance purchasers;188 (e) the number of people 
who actually buy hazardous waste insurance, and the amounts 
••• This determination of safe levels (or of various risk levels) will not be easy. A very 
small percentage of the chemicals in use has been tested for toxic effects. Toxicity of low 
level but prolonged exposure is difficult to determine, due to the potential influence of 
other factors which cannot be held constant over long time periods. Chemicals which may 
be harmless, or perhaps only slightly toxic, in isolation may have synergistic effects when 
combined, leading to highly toxic compounds. II. Actuarial rates may be more difficult to determine for hazardous waste disposal sites 
than for floods, since fewer records are available for hazardous waste disasters than for 
floods. This problem may be less severe by the time the potential impact area maps have 
been drawn, since more hazardous waste disasters can be expected (unfortunately). These 
disasters should not be the result of unmindful dumping of hazardous wastes in the future, 
once RCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (1977), becomes effective. However, as mentioned 
before, RCRA is silent on abandoned hazardous waste sites. 
II' If proposals for an overall national health insurance program were enacted, this 
might affect the type of physical injury covered and upper limits to such coverage. A 
clause could be included in the NHWIP legislation so as to preclude double collection 
from federal insurance programs, yet allow supplemental coverage in one of the programs . 
... Unless new evidence discloses that everyone in the nation is subject to substantial 
risk from hazardous wastes, it does not seem economically efficient to have a national 
health insurance program for hazardous wastes with everyone paying a premium. The 
NHWIP would not be this broad. 
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purchased by these buyers; (0 the actual incidence of hazardous 
waste damages; and (g) the time frame chosen for mapping all 
potential impact areas. Until decisions are made at the legislative 
level regarding pending legislation, and until more research has 
been done to indicate how many hazardous waste dumps will cre-
ate problems each year and how severe these problems will be, it 
is difficult to argue for specific rates or limits on coverage. Fur-
ther research is necessary in order to determine the cost of a haz-
ardous waste insurance program designed to achieve a specific 
level of relief and mapping. Alternatively, such research could es-
timate the amount of relief and mapping which could be done for 
a given appropriation of funds. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
New York State's Love Canal, Kentucky's Valley of the Drums, 
and North Carolina's 210 miles of PCB-contaminated highways 
are only a small indication of the hazardous waste problems ac-
companying the improved living standards which depend largely 
upon the chemical industry. This article has assessed the present 
state of knowledge regarding the scope of the toxic waste dump 
problem in the United States with an emphasis on urban areas 
where more people would be affected by exposure to toxic wastes. 
The cost of containing toxic wastes in present storage sites, and of 
cleanup and restoration of hazardous waste dumps was also 
examined. 
Existing legislation on hazardous wastes is silent on the issue of 
abandoned toxic waste sites. Several proposals are now pending 
at the congressional level. However, each has shortcomings, par-
ticularly, regarding the individual's potential health problems, 
loss of livelihood, or loss of property as a result of toxic waste 
sites. The policy suggested here which is similar in rationale and 
structure to the National Flood Insurance Program, would give 
potential victims the opportunity to protect themselves from haz-
ardous waste damages, through purchase of federally subsidized 
insurance. Not only would this have the advantage of providing· 
that beneficiaries of the program bear at least part of the cost, it 
would also have the potential for reducing disaster relief pay-
ments to communities by coupling availability of insurance to de-
velopment planning focused on reducing the chance of toxic waste 
damage. 
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The Policy Proposal In Summary Form 
A. People in communities where hazardous waste sites may be lo-
cated would be able to purchase subsidized insurance to protect them 
from damages caused by leakage of these wastes. 
B. Insurance could cover physical damage requiring medical treat-
ment, property damage resulting in repair work or loss of value, and 
loss of livelihood. 
C. Availability of hazardous waste insurance would be coupled with 
community regulation of development in areas prone to hazardous 
waste damage. 
D. Communities would be encouraged to participate in the hazard-
ous waste insurance program by requiring participation as a condition 
for eligibility for federally-connected financing of any development in 
potential impact areas, as in the National Flood Insurance Program. 
E. This insurance program could become a strong companion to 
some of the related pending legislation. For example, community par-
ticipation in the program could be required in order for the commu-
nity to be eligible for the corrective assistance suggested in pending 
legislation. Cleanup of an abandoned toxic waste dump will not erase 
the damages already suffered by people in the potential impact area, 
so the need for the insurance program would remain even if all aban-
doned sites were secured. In addition, these cleaned up sites would 
not be secure forever. In-use hazardous waste facilities are also sub-
ject to accidental releases of toxic materials. 
F. As in the National Flood Insurance Program, once the primary 
impact area maps have been completed, all new construction would 
be insurable at actuarial rates, rather than at subsidized rates. 
This policy will not eliminate the hazardous waste problem. It 
has the advantage, however, of restoring to potential victims some 
of the loss they have suffered and of providing that those who 
may benefit from the program bear a large portion of its costs. 
